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Abstract
To investigate dual-process persuasion theories in the context of group decision making,
we studied low and high need-for-cognition (NFC) participants within a mock trial study.
Participants considered plaintiff and defense expert scientific testimony that varied in argu-
ment strength. All participants heard a cross-examination of the experts focusing on periph-
eral information (e.g., credentials) about the expert, but half were randomly assigned to
also hear central information highlighting flaws in the expert’s message (e.g., quality of the
research presented by the expert). Participants rendered pre- and post-group-deliberation
verdicts, which were considered “scientifically accurate” if the verdicts reflected the strong
(versus weak) expert message, and “scientifically inaccurate” if they reflected the weak (ver-
sus strong) expert message. For individual participants, we replicated studies testing classic
persuasion theories: Factors promoting reliance on central information (i.e., central cross-
examination, high NFC) improved verdict accuracy because they sensitized individual par-
ticipants to the quality discrepancy between the experts’ messages. Interestingly, however,
at the group level, the more that scientifically accurate mock jurors discussed peripheral
(versus central) information about the experts, the more likely their group was to reach the
scientifically accurate verdict. When participants were arguing for the scientifically accurate
verdict consistent with the strong expert message, peripheral comments increased their per-
suasiveness, which made the group more likely to reach the more scientifically accurate
verdict.
Introduction
When we make decisions, from voting in the upcoming election to buying a new couch, we
must evaluate the strength of conflicting persuasive messages and ultimately side with one.
Influential dual-process models of persuasive communication (Elaboration Likelihood Model
[ELM], [1]; Heuristic-Systematic Model [HSM], [2–3]) assert that focusing on the substantive
content of a message (i.e., central processing focused on the strength of the message itself)
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helps individuals evaluate argument strength more accurately than heuristics about the mes-
sage source (i.e., peripheral processing focused on irrelevant or tangential information about
the source of the message). Although much work has examined how individuals evaluate con-
flicting persuasive appeals, tests of such dual-process persuasion models in a group context are
rare. Given that American society leaves important decisions to groups, from juries to Con-
gress, it is crucial to examine the process by which groups evaluate the strength of conflicting
persuasive appeals.
In the context of a legal trial, jurors often must evaluate two opposing expert witnesses
delivering conflicting testimony that varies in message strength. We used this context to inves-
tigate how mock jurors’ reliance on central and peripheral information about the experts influ-
ences their ability to reach accurate decisions about which of two opposing experts to trust.
We examined this at both the individual (juror) and group (jury) level. Specifically, at the indi-
vidual level, we hypothesized that encouraging mock jurors to focus on the central information
delivered by expert witnesses would help them evaluate the strength of the witnesses’ messages.
Yet at the group level, we had reason to make the novel prediction that complementing central
information about the quality of experts’ scientific evidence (i.e., message) during group delib-
eration with peripheral information about the experts’ credentials (i.e., source) would make
jurors favoring the stronger expert more persuasive to their co-jurors, thereby helping the jury
reach a consensus decision in line with the more scientifically valid argument; a hypothesis we
justify theoretically below.
Dual process models and individuals
The current investigation is informed by two seminal dual-process models theorizing that peo-
ple can process persuasive messages through two different routes. The first route is a delibera-
tive, effortful route (i.e., “centrally” according to the ELM, [1], or “systematically” according to
the HSM, [2]). The second route is quicker and more efficient (i.e., “peripherally” according to
the ELM, or “heuristically” according to the HSM). This tenet is shared conceptually with
other dual-process models (System-1/System-2 reasoning, [4–5]). The two routes to persua-
sion are characterized by one’s reliance on two different types of information. The central (or
systematic) route is characterized by reliance on scrutinizing the substantive merit of the actual
message (e.g., the scientific merit of an expert witness’ testimony) whereas the peripheral (or
heuristic) route is characterized by heuristic reliance on contextual or peripheral cues about
the source of the message (e.g., an expert witness’ credentials) [1].
The ELM posits that people engage in one or the other, while the HSM allows for simulta-
neous systematic and heuristic processing—but both models account for the two routes to per-
suasion and specify factors that encourage reliance on one route versus the other. Factors that
increase motivation and/or ability to focus on central, rather than peripheral, information help
people assess argument strength more accurately. One such factor is an individual difference
factor called need for cognition (NFC, [6]). High NFC people, who are generally inclined to
think deeply, are more likely to rely on central information than peripheral information [7–8]
and in turn, discriminate better between strong and weak messages (e.g., [9–10]). In contrast,
low NFC people, who are less inclined to process a message deeply, are more affected by heu-
ristic (i.e., peripheral) information (e.g., source expertise level, [11]; how much an expert is
paid to testify,[12]), which can interfere with accurate assessments of a message’s substantive
strength [13].
In court trials, both central and peripheral information about expert testimony can be rele-
vant to jurors’ decisions. For example, when judging expert witnesses’ credibility, jurors are
actually instructed to consider some peripheral information, such as the quality of the experts’
Central and peripheral information in group deliberation
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credentials [14]. Yet, although peripheral information might be relevant to jurors’ assessment
of the expert’s overall credibility, prior research suggests that peripheral information can inter-
fere with one’s ability to evaluate whether an expert is presenting a strong or weak message
(e.g., when an expert witness bases his or her testimony on a scientifically valid versus invalid
study). Specifically, studies have shown that peripheral information can, in fact, distract mock
jurors from assessing the quality of the expert’s central message—particularly mock jurors
who are prone to rely on peripheral information. For example, manipulations of the validity of
scientific procedures presented by an expert witness (i.e., central information) affect judg-
ments made by mock jurors with high, but not low, need for cognition [15]. Conversely,
manipulations of source credibility (i.e., peripheral information) affect judgments made by
participants with low, but not high, NFC [16]. Contextual factors also influence jurors’ routes
to persuasion. For example, when mock jurors hear expert testimony delivered in complex,
hard-to-process language versus simple language, they are less likely to recognize flaws in sci-
entific evidence (i.e., central information) and more likely to rely on peripheral information
about the experts’ credentials, such as their payment for and frequency of testimony [12, 17].
Thus, we predicted that factors that promote reliance on central information about expert tes-
timony would help individual mock jurors correctly assess the quality of expert testimony. More
specifically, we predicted that being (a) intrinsically motivated to rely on central information
(i.e., being higher in NFC) and (b) extrinsically prompted to rely on central information about
the experts, would both lead to scientifically accurate verdicts in line with the strong expert. We
manipulated extrinsic motivation to rely on central information by randomly assigning half of
our mock jurors to hear a cross-examination of the weak expert that highlighted flaws in the
expert’s message (i.e., the validity of his research).
Dual-process models and groups
Despite ample research testing dual-process models of persuasion at the individual level, cur-
rent knowledge falls short when considering group decision making. How do groups use cen-
tral and peripheral information about dueling experts during deliberation, and how do these
arguments shape the quality of a final group decision? The only study we know of that includes
prolonged, live group discussion and a unanimity requirement for the final group decision (as
juries usually do) found that mock jurors with higher NFC (i.e., who are more inclined to
focus on central information) talked more and were perceived as more persuasive than their
lower NFC counterparts [18]. This study did not, however, investigate mock jurors’ evaluation
of message strength or opinion change (i.e., persuasion).
In other group-decision-making studies, McKimmie and colleagues specifically manipu-
lated central and peripheral information about a persuasion source (in the context of jury deci-
sions, [19]; and in the context of organizational decision making, [20–21]). These authors
conclude that their work demonstrates the potential for group deliberation to promote reliance
on both central and peripheral information—for example, mock jurors were affected by the
gender of an expert only after they deliberated as a group [19]. We note, however, that Rijnb-
out & McKimmie [20–21] operationalized their central factor as the strength of a job appli-
cant’s Curriculum Vitae (CV). It is difficult to apply this specific central factor manipulation to
the context of expert witnesses because—although the strength of an applicant’s CV might be
central to the argument being made in that context (i.e., that an applicant is the best candidate
for a job)—the strength of an expert’s CV would be peripheral to their in-court message (i.e.,
testimony that is relevant to the case). In other words, in the context of expert testimony, CV
strength would be communicating information about an expert’s credentials, which would be
peripheral in this context because credentials (like witness gender) have no bearing specifically
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on the strength of the central, substantive content of the expert’s testimony. This is true even
though credentials might be relevant in considering the expert’s overall credibility. Further,
although we learn a lot about group decision making from these studies, the generalizability of
these results to trial decision making is somewhat limited because two of the studies included
computer simulation of a scripted interaction with confederates rather than actual groups
interacting, and the other allowed only 5 minutes of discussion and did not require a unani-
mous group-level decision.
Will group deliberation help or hinder evaluation of message strength?. Group discus-
sion can shift individuals’ opinions to the degree that it provides them with persuasive argu-
ments [22–23], which could help or hinder group evaluation of message strength. On the one
hand, deliberation might provide an opportunity for individuals who rely on the central infor-
mation conveyed by a persuasive message (such as the quality of an expert witness’s scientific
evidence) to educate and persuade those who do not naturally do so. This would help the
group reach a consensus decision that is in line with a strong (rather than weak) message. On
the other hand, if group discussion is dominated by group members who are heavily focused
on peripheral information (such as how much money an expert was paid to testify in court),
and group members are seduced by those weak arguments, deliberation might lead the group
decision astray. Thus, whether deliberation will help or hinder accuracy might depend on how
much discussion is focused on central, rather than peripheral, information about experts.
Work on each of these situations is detailed next.
The value of central information in groups’ evaluation of message strength. The poten-
tial benefit of discussing central information during group decision making is clear: The more
group members discuss central information within an expert’s message (e.g., the scientific evi-
dence underlying their testimony), the more likely the group members are to evaluate the mes-
sage strength accurately. Consequently, if there are dueling experts on opposite sides of an
issue, and one expert’s message is stronger than the other’s, the more group members discuss
the substance of the experts’ messages specifically, the more likely they are to recognize that
one expert has a stronger message than the other. Group members who had the motivation
and ability to have noticed the message quality discrepancy might be able to help simplify the
information for those who were either unwilling or unable to do so on their own. Ultimately,
this could lead to their group reaching the more “accurate” consensus verdict. For the purpose
of the current study, we are defining accuracy solely as a verdict in line with scientifically
strong, rather than weak, expert testimony, while acknowledging that the legal system theoreti-
cally defines a jury’s verdict as definitive and therefore legally accurate regardless.
The importance of discussing task-relevant information during group decision making in
reaching accurate decisions has been established by several seminal studies of realistic group
deliberations. For example, Kaplan and Miller’s work [24–26] demonstrates that shifts in
group decisions are driven by group members sharing task-relevant information (see also
[27]), particularly when the group is required to reach unanimity [26]. Yet these studies did
not distinguish between task-relevant information focused on central versus peripheral infor-
mation. Our study extends this work by testing whether sharing information helps groups
reach better decisions when focused on central, rather than peripheral, information.
The value of peripheral information in groups’ evaluation of message strength. Much
prior research at the individual level suggests that reliance on peripheral information during
group discussion might distract groups from assessing central message strength. Yet we argue
that peripheral information might actually help groups reach a unanimous decision in favor of
a strong message when that peripheral information is in the “right” hands—that is, when the
peripheral information is used by group members who are themselves already persuaded by
the stronger message, to convince the others who are not. Group decision making involves a
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key component that individual decision making does not: intragroup persuasion. Dual-process
models predict that individuals who process centrally (versus peripherally) are more likely to
reach the correct decision on average. But for a group to reach consensus, this is only the first
step. The next important step is for group members who are arguing for the substantively
strong message to persuade other group members who are arguing for the weak message (that
is, group members who probably did not individually rely on central information initially).
Of course, we expected that reiterating strong, central information would be effective in
persuading like-minded people (i.e., other group members already prone to favor the strong
message), but to reach consensus, all group members must be persuaded—including those
who are either unable or unmotivated to rely on central information. In that case, the more
accurate group members might need to generate arguments that are persuasive to both people
who are convinced by central information and people who are convinced by peripheral infor-
mation. Fabrigar and Petty [28] provide indirect support by demonstrating that group mem-
bers sometimes need to match their appeal to what group members find appealing. In trials,
what is appealing might not be what is scientifically sound. That is, arguments ideal for persua-
sion are clear and convincing but not necessarily well reasoned or strong [29]. Peripheral heu-
ristics are easy to understand, persuasive, and even more convincing to group members who
are not naturally inclined to assess the strength of the central information themselves. Thus,
we reasoned that peripheral information might serve an important function in group accuracy:
The more that group members who are already arguing for the strong message augment their
central information with peripheral information (strategically or not), the more persuasive
they might be to a group with diverse cognitive styles, ultimately facilitating group consensus
on the better decision. Our study is the first test of this theory at the group level, but it is sup-
ported by HSM’s contention that systematic and heuristic processing can occur simulta-
neously to facilitate attitude change at the individual level (e.g., [3, 30–31]).
Study overview and hypotheses
We conducted a study in two phases. In the first phase we assessed participants’ NFC in a large
departmental mass-testing session. Based on these scores, we recruited low and high NFC par-
ticipants for an ostensibly unrelated mock trial experiment several weeks later, wherein partici-
pants considered opposing plaintiff and defense expert testimony varying in argument strength.
All participants heard a cross-examination of the experts focusing on peripheral information
(e.g., credentials) about the experts, but half were randomly assigned to also hear central infor-
mation highlighting flaws in the weaker expert’s message (e.g., quality of the research presented
by the expert). We assessed the scientific accuracy of individual judgments before and after
deliberation and group-level accuracy after deliberation. As discussed previously, although
there is typically no ground truth to determine whether a jury’s verdict is legally “accurate” in
real trials, carefully controlled experimental design enabled us to operationalize “accuracy” (for
the purpose of this study) as the verdict consistent with testimony given by the expert who pre-
sented strong, rather than weak, scientific evidence (i.e., experiments with scientific integrity).
This is the first study, to our knowledge, to test the effects of NFC and central cross-exami-
nation in a realistic group setting requiring a unanimous decision, and the first to analyze the
central and peripheral content of mock juror deliberation comments (but see [32] research
addressing similar issues involving real jurors). The mock jury paradigm provides a realistic,
engaging context for individuals to assess argument strength and reach consensus, and it has
produced seminal group decision-making findings (e.g., [26, 33–34]). It also increases the
practical importance of our study, providing a theoretical foundation for identifying interven-
tions to improve jurors’ accuracy in assessing the validity of scientific evidence in court.
Central and peripheral information in group deliberation
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Individual-level hypotheses. Based on dual-process models, we predicted that the
helpfulness of group deliberation would depend on whether participants were induced to
focus on central information about the expert testimony via cross-examination (i.e., flaws in
the weak expert’s message). We predicted a three-way interaction between cross-examination
type, juror NFC, and deliberation: When participants are induced to focus on only peripheral
information about an expert via cross-examination, we predicted that deliberation would make
low NFC participants (who are already prone to rely on peripheral information) less accurate.
In contrast, high NFC participants (who already tend to focus on central information) would
be buffered against this accuracy decline during deliberation because they will naturally focus
on central information even when not induced to do so via cross-examination.
In contrast, when participants are induced to focus on central information about an expert
(in addition to peripheral information) via cross-examination, their accuracy would increase
after deliberation regardless of NFC. We predicted this simple main effect in this condition
because we expected that specifically highlighting flaws in the weak expert’s central message
would help both high NFC participants (who are already focused on central information) and
low NFC participants (who are not naturally inclined or able to rely on central information,
but whom we expected to do so when prompted by cross-examination).
We also tested our theoretical explanation for this effect, predicting that when participants
focus on central information about the experts’ message, deliberation would sensitize partici-
pants to the quality discrepancy between the experts’ messages, which would increase verdict
accuracy.
Group-level hypotheses. Our group-level hypotheses were more exploratory. After cod-
ing all deliberation comments about the experts’ testimony, we calculated two proportions that
represented the percentage of deliberation comments about experts that were focused on
peripheral as opposed to central information (e.g., 45% would mean that 45% of a jury’s com-
ments about the experts were peripheral and 55% were central)—we calculated a proportion at
the individual-juror and jury level. We tested two competing group-level hypotheses. The first
prediction was that there would be a negative relation between the proportion of peripheral
deliberation comments and verdict accuracy, such that the more the mock jury discussed
peripheral (in proportion to central) information about the expert testimony, the less likely the
jury would reach more scientifically accurate verdict by siding with the expert who presented
strong (versus weak) research (i.e., message strength).
The competing hypothesis is consistent with the theory outlined earlier that the most
persuasive arguments need not be well reasoned, but rather must match what appeals to
the listener [29]. Specifically, we predicted that there would be a positive relation between
the proportion of peripheral deliberation comments and verdict accuracy: The more the
mock jury augmented central comments with peripheral comments, the more likely the
jury would agree on the scientifically accurate verdict. But, this prediction included a mod-
erator—the scientific accuracy of the participants themselves. Specifically, we predicted
that the positive relation between peripheral information discussion and a more accurate
verdict would hold only when peripheral information is used by more “scientifically accu-
rate” participants—those who already favored the expert presenting the strong message.
That is, peripheral deliberation comments could make scientifically accurate participants
more persuasive to their group (by appealing to what non-scientifically leaning participants
like to hear), and in turn, increase the likelihood that their groups would reach consensus
on the more accurate verdict. This was not predicted for scientifically inaccurate partici-
pants, because making them more persuasive would lead the group toward the less scientifi-
cally accurate verdict.
Central and peripheral information in group deliberation
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Method
Participants
Participants were undergraduate students at a large Midwestern university. Need for cognition
was assessed in mass-testing sessions during three semesters from 2007–2009 (n = 1887 total).
Participants from the top and bottom thirds of the NFC distribution (Low NFC: range = 21–56,
M = 49.00, SD = 6.07; High NFC: range = 65–90, M = 71.32, SD = 5.17) were able to sign up for
the ostensibly unrelated experimental sessions. Participants in this second experimental phase
(n = 192) were assigned to 32 6-person juries (Mage = 19 years, SD = 1.73; 65% women; 41%
White, 25% Asian, 16% Hispanic/Latino, 9% African American, 3% Native Hawaiian/Pacific
Islander). NFC scores in this experimental sample (range = 34–85, M = 60.24, SD = 13.18) were
similar across juries, F(1, 160) = .14, p = 1.00.
Materials
All experimental materials and measures are included in supplemental information (see S1
File).
Trial stimulus
The trial stimulus was an audiotaped version of a trial transcript (modified from [17]) includ-
ing an actor posing as the judge who read a summary of the trial evidence and jury instruc-
tions, as well as direct-examination and cross-examination of two actors posing as expert
witnesses. Participants were given a trial character sheet with the names of and facts about
each of the expert witnesses and a copy of the actual Illinois pattern jury instructions appropri-
ate for the case. Trial lawyers and an expert on jury instructions reviewed all materials to
ensure their ecological validity.
The trial described a plaintiff who alleged that his colon cancer was the result of workplace
exposure to chemicals called polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs). The plaintiff’s expert witness
presented a study demonstrating a link between PCBs and cancer in rats; the defense’s expert
witness presented a study finding no such link. The testimony focused on this scientific evi-
dence rather than whether the company exposed the plaintiff to the PCBs (which was made
unequivocally clear in the trial summary) to ensure that verdict decisions were a pure reflec-
tion of how participants assessed the experts’ scientific testimony.
To assess participants’ evaluation of expert message strength, the transcript described two
experts offering contradictory conclusions about whether PCBs are related to cancer. One
expert presented a strong message; that is, testimony based on the description of a scientifically
high-quality study that used valid and reliable methodology. The other expert presented a
weak message; that is, testimony based on the description of a scientifically low-quality study
using flawed research methodology). This allowed us to investigate how “scientifically accu-
rate” our mock jurors and their verdicts were, by operationalizing the decisions as more accu-
rate when they were in line with the strong (rather than weak) expert’s message. The strong
study had a control group, an ecologically valid method of dosing the study rats with PCBs,
and was peer reviewed and published. In contrast, the weak study did not have a control
group, had a less ecologically valid method of dosing the rats with PCBs, and had not been
peer reviewed or published. The complexity of the two experts’ testimonies were similar
according to (a) the original study [17], (b) a Microsoft Word difficulty assessment (both
testimonies = 8th grade reading level), and (c) a Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count analysis
([35]; the percentage of “big words” were similar: 18.63% of the defense testimony, 19.41% of
the plaintiff testimony).
Central and peripheral information in group deliberation
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Precautions were taken to ensure that no peripheral information about the experts (e.g.,
their credentials, testimony record, manner of speaking, etc.) was systematically related (i.e.,
confounded) with their message strength. First, all peripheral information about the experts
was held as constant as possible: They had similar credentials, were paid similar amounts for
testifying, and testified previously in trials for their current side in this case (i.e., plaintiff vs.
defense) with roughly the same frequency. Second, the audiotapes were counterbalanced, such
that half of the participants heard (a) the plaintiff expert present the strong message and the
defense expert present the weak message while the other half heard the reverse, and (b) Actor
A as the plaintiff expert and Actor B as the defense expert while the other half heard the
reverse. Therefore, peripheral information about the experts in this study was unrelated to
which expert was presenting the strong versus weak message. All analyses collapsed across
these counterbalanced conditions. (See Fig 1 for a diagram of the full design with counterbal-
anced conditions and the collapsed version used for analyses.)
Cross-examination-type manipulation
Both experts in all conditions were cross-examined with attempts to discredit them relying on
peripheral information (i.e., heuristics) that jurors sometimes use when they are unable or
unmotivated to process an expert’s message: (a) their credentials and qualifications, (b) how
often they testify for the plaintiff/defense, and (c) their payment for testifying (to suggest they
are biased “hired guns”, [14]). This portion of the cross-examination was held constant across
Fig 1. Counterbalancing conditions and final study design.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0183580.g001
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all conditions—both experts were always attacked via peripheral information during cross-
examination. In other words, the cross-examination of the strong expert was the same across
cross-examination conditions and included peripheral information similar to the peripheral
cross-examination of the weak expert.
We manipulated whether—in addition to this peripheral cross-examination information—
participants also heard a portion of the cross-examination that drew attention to central infor-
mation that highlighted flaws in the weak expert’s message (i.e., the lack of control group, non-
ecologically valid method of dosing the rats, and lack of peer review). Thus, all participants
heard attacks on the weak expert via peripheral information, but in addition, half of the partici-
pants also heard the weak expert attacked via central information about flaws in the expert’s
message itself (“central + peripheral”). The other half did not (“peripheral only”). We chose
this manipulation, rather than a purely peripheral versus purely central cross-examination, to
test whether focusing cross-examination on central information can improve mock jurors’
assessment of experts above and beyond the standard peripheral information that attorneys
are taught to use (e.g., [36–37]).
Measures
Need for cognition [38]. Participants completed the 18-item short form of the NFC scale
(α = .85). This scale assesses a person’s intrinsic motivation to process information thoroughly
(e.g., “I would prefer a task that is intellectual, difficult, and important to one that is somewhat
important but does not require much thought”) on a 5-point response scale ranging from 1
(Extremely Uncharacteristic) to 5 (Extremely Characteristic). NFC is an oft-used and valid pre-
dictor of an individual’s natural inclination to engage in central processing [6].
Individual verdict accuracy. After the evidence presentation, but before deliberation,
participants individually chose pre-deliberation verdicts, which were recoded to reflect
whether the participants chose the “scientifically accurate” or “scientifically inaccurate” ver-
dict (i.e., the verdict in line with the strong or weak expert message, respectively). This cod-
ing depended on the counterbalancing condition: If the participants heard a strong plaintiff
and weak defense expert, the pro-plaintiff verdict would be the “scientifically accurate” ver-
dict, and vice versa. Participants also indicated confidence in their verdict on an 11-point
scale ranging from 0% to 100%. This measure was combined with their verdict to create a
more sensitive 22-point individual verdict accuracy bipolar scale ranging from 100% confi-
dent in the scientifically accurate verdict to 100% confident in the scientifically inaccurate
verdict (Fig 2; e.g., [39–40]).
Fig 2. Individual verdict accuracy scale.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0183580.g002
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Group verdict accuracy. A dichotomous variable reflected whether the group reached
consensus on the scientifically accurate verdict or was unable to reach consensus on the scien-
tifically accurate verdict (either because they reached consensus on the scientifically inaccurate
verdict or because they were unable to reach consensus at all).
Expert credibility. Participants indicated their perceptions of the plaintiff and defense
experts’ credibility, based on the evidence they presented, on a 6-point scale ranging from Very
Not Credible to Very Credible (e.g., [41–42]) before and after deliberation.
Participants’ persuasiveness to their co-jurors. Participants rated how persuasive each
of their co-jurors had been during deliberation on a 5-point scale from Not at all to Very. Each
participant’s rating score was the average of their 5 co-jurors’ ratings of their persuasiveness.
Demographics. Gender, age, ethnicity, and U.S. citizenship were assessed.
Procedure
In Phase 1, participants completed the NFC scale during mass testing sessions, where nearly
the entire university subject pool simultaneously completed numerous and varied measures.
Several weeks to three months later, participants in the top and bottom third of the NFC distri-
bution were allowed to sign up for Phase 2, the ostensibly unrelated mock trial experiment. To
obtain 3 high- and 3 low-NFC participants for each Phase 2 mock trial session, all sessions had
two separate sign-up postings that each included four available participant spots: one posting
visible to high NFC participants and one posting visible to low NFC participants (without par-
ticipants’ knowing that NFC was the selection criterion). We overbooked in case of no-shows
to ensure 3 high and 3 low NFC participants on each mock jury. If more than 3 of each showed
up for a session, we randomly excused extra participants.
After providing written consent, participants reviewed the trial character sheet (which they
kept throughout the study for reference) and listened to the audio recording of the judge’s
summary of trial evidence, while reading the transcript of this audio recording. Next, they lis-
tened to one of the eight audiotaped versions of the expert testimony (encompassing the cross-
examination-type manipulation and the expert quality and expert actor counterbalanced con-
ditions) and then they listened to Illinois Pattern jury instructions. Next, participants com-
pleted individual pre-deliberation verdict and expert credibility measures, after which they
deliberated with their group until a unanimous group verdict was reached, or until half an
hour had elapsed (20% did not reach consensus in that time). All deliberations were video-
taped. After deliberation ended, participants individually completed post-deliberation verdicts,
confidence, expert credibility, and participant persuasiveness measures. Finally, participants
were thanked, debriefed, and given course credit for their participation. Each session took
approximately 2 hours. Deliberations were transcribed. All materials and procedures were
approved by the University of Illinois at Chicago Institutional Review Board.
Deliberation coding
We developed a novel coding protocol to evaluate the extent to which participants relied on
central versus peripheral information when attempting to reach consensus; specifically,
whether participants were discussing the expert’s central message or peripheral information
about the expert’s credibility as a source when deciding which expert to trust. Two indepen-
dent coders, blind to condition, reliably coded 20% of the transcripts according to the criteria
described below. Disagreements were resolved through discussion and each rater coded half of
the remaining transcripts.
The coding protocol first established “deliberation comment” units (i.e., the smallest mean-
ingful unit of information; 94% agreement), which were then coded for mentions of at least
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one expert (90% agreement). Of the 3959 deliberation comments, 41% (n = 1642) were about
at least one of the expert witnesses (21% about plaintiff expert, 13% about defense expert, 7%
about both experts). Each expert-related comment was further coded for evidence of reliance
on central or peripheral information, rejection of peripheral information, or unclassifiable
statements (over 86% agreement on all codes).
Central deliberation comments. Comments in which participants brought up the sub-
stantive content of the expert’s message, such as his study methodology, were coded as indica-
tive of reliance on central information. For example, “Dr. Fallon didn’t have a control group
and he injected the rats with larger doses, it wasn’t the doses the employees were exposed to.”
In this comment, the participant is reviewing the message content and evaluating its merit.
Peripheral deliberation comments. Comments in which participants brought up a heu-
ristic about the expert as a source (e.g., payment for testifying) that did not focus on the substan-
tive message of his testimony, were coded as indicative of reliance on peripheral information.
For example, “Dr. Campbell testified more for the companies, they can, like, compensate him
more than the plaintiff could” [sic]. In this comment, the participant is arguing to not rely on
Dr. Campbell’s testimony because he testified for a company that could pay him more than a
single plaintiff could him.
Rejection-of-peripheral deliberation comments. Rejection-of-peripheral deliberation
comments were comments in which participants explicitly rejected peripheral information as
an unreliable basis for judging expert credibility. For example, “I wasn’t sure why they brought
the whole ‘getting paid for’ either, I found it irrelevant. . . like they both got paid for it any-
ways.” In this comment, the participant is arguing against relying on the peripheral informa-
tion that the expert got paid to judge credibility because it applies to both experts.
Unclassifiable comments. Finally, comments were coded as unclassifiable when it was
not clear whether the participant’s statement was based on reliance on central or peripheral
information. For example, “I just believed the first doctor so much more.” In this comment, it
is unclear whether the participant believes the doctor more because of central information
(e.g., his research) or peripheral information (e.g., where he went to school).
Results
Individual verdict accuracy
Descriptive statistics for all participants’ case judgments are reported in Table 1. Our first anal-
yses tested our hypothesis that the helpfulness of deliberation would depend on participants’
NFC and whether cross-examination focused participants’ attention on the expert’s central
information. We tested the predicted 3-way interaction with a 3-level multilevel model that
nested repeated measures within individual participants, and participants nested within juries.
The model accounted for the non-independence of pre- versus post-deliberation judgments
by clustering these judgments within individual participants. That is, the same participant ren-
dered the pre- and post-deliberation judgments. The model also accounted for the non-inde-
pendence of individual judgments by clustering all participants’ judgments within their
respective jury. That is, each jury comprised 6 participants, making each grouping of 6 people
share an experience different from each other grouping of 6. Our model accounted for this
extraneous variance. The model included the following predictors: (a) the effects of pre-delib-
eration versus post-deliberation judgments, within individuals (Level 1), (b) participants’ con-
tinuous NFC scores, between individuals (Level 2), (c) cross-examination type, between
groups (Level 3), and (d) all possible interactions on individual verdict accuracy (controlling
for the counterbalanced witness-quality version).
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Individual participants were more confident in the accurate verdict when they heard a
cross-examination that focused them on central (versus peripheral) information about the
expert, B = 4.17, t(28) = 3.53, p = .002, 95% CIs = [1.85, 6.49]. This effect (and a significant
deliberation × NFC interaction, B = -.11, t[365] = 3.00, p = .003, 95% CIs = [.04, .19]) were
qualified, however, by the predicted significant three-way interaction, B = -.17, t(365) = -3.18,
p = .002, 95% CIs = [-.27, -.06] (see Fig 3). No other main effects or two-way interactions were
significant, Bs |2.99|, ps .130.
Table 1.
Overall Central + Peripheral
Cross-Examination
Peripheral Cross-Examination
Pre-Deliberation Post-Deliberation Pre-Deliberation Post-Deliberation
Individual verdict accuracy 16.39 16.28 17.51 15.27 16.52
(7.03) (6.54) (6.87) (7.12) (7.43)
Credibility of strong expert 4.83 4.52 5.07 4.64 4.76
(0.98) (1.59) (0.98) (0.98) (0.96)
Credibility of weak expert 4.37 4.45 3.52 4.88 4.36
(1.25) (1.64) (1.25) (1.06) (1.20)
Means (SDs) for Case Judgments as a Function of Cross-Examination Type and Deliberation
Notes. Individual verdict accuracy ranges from 1 (100% confident in incorrect verdict) to 22 (100% confident in correct verdict). Expert credibility scores
range from 1 (Very not credible) to 6 (Very credible). As noted in methods, “Peripheral Cross-Examination” refers to a cross-examination of the weak expert
that focused exclusively on peripheral information against the expert. “Central + Peripheral Cross-Examination” refers to a cross-examination of the weak
expert that included both the peripheral information but also central information against the expert.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0183580.t001
Fig 3. Individual verdict accuracy as a function of pre- versus post-deliberation, NFC, and cross-
examination type condition.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0183580.g003
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To probe this interaction, we assessed the simple deliberation x NFC interaction separately
for each cross-examination type condition. As expected, when participants heard the cross
examination that focused on central information against the weak expert, group deliberation
made them more accurate, B = 2.17, t(365) = 6.05, p< .001, 95% CIs = [1.46, 2.87]—regardless
of their need for cognition. That is, the simple deliberation × NFC interaction was not signifi-
cant in this condition, B = -.05, t(365) = -1.50, p = .13, 95% CIs = [-.13, .02]. In contrast, when
participants heard the cross examination that included only peripheral information, we found
a significant simple deliberation × NFC interaction, B = .11, t(365) = 3.00, p = .003, 95% CIs =
[.04, .18]: Lower NFC participants (i.e., who are dispositionally prone to rely on peripheral
information) became marginally less accurate over the course of deliberation, B = -3.77, t(365)
= -1.90, p = .058, 95% CIs = [-7.68, .14], 90% CIs = [-7.05, -.49], but higher NFC participants
were buffered against this decline in accuracy during deliberation, B = 2.12, t(365) = 2.34, p =
.37, 95% CIs = [-2.49, 6.73.]
Mediation analysis: Why did deliberation increase accuracy when guided by cross-
examination that focused on central information?. At the individual level, we expected that
(consistent with dual-process models), when deliberation was guided by a cross-examination
that focused participants on central information against the weak expert, they would be sensi-
tized to the quality discrepancy between the two experts as a result of group deliberation (i.e.,
from pre- to post-deliberation), and in turn their individual verdict accuracy would increase
after deliberation. Because the analyses described above revealed that deliberation helped (i.e.,
made individual participants more accurate) only when they had been focused on central
information about the weak expert during cross-examination, we limited the mediation analy-
sis to this condition. We followed Selig and Preacher’s [43] instructions for Monte Carlo simu-
lations to assess mediation with their online tool for generating indirect-effects confidence
intervals (http://www.quantpsy.org/medmc/medmc.htm). This analysis included the path
coefficients and associated standard errors from (a) two multilevel linear regressions (with
pre- and post-deliberation judgments nested within individual participants and participants
nested within juries), each with the independent variable (deliberation) predicting one of the
two mediators (perceived credibility of the expert presenting strong and the expert presenting
weak messages; i.e., a paths in Fig 4), and (b) one multi-level linear regression with the per-
ceived expert credibility measures predicting the dependent variable (individual verdict accu-
racy; i.e., b paths in Fig 4) with the independent variable (deliberation) included.
Fig 4. The indirect effect of deliberation on individual verdict accuracy through expert credibility.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0183580.g004
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The dual-mediator model analysis tested the indirect effects of deliberation on individual
verdict accuracy through participants’ assessments of the credibility of the experts in the cen-
tral + peripheral cross-examination condition.
This analysis revealed that the predicted indirect effects of deliberation on individual partic-
ipants’ verdict accuracy through perceptions of both the strong and weak experts’ credibility
were significant—but with very different patterns. Deliberation made participants rate the
expert presenting the strong message as more credible, which in turn made them more confi-
dent in the scientifically accurate verdict. Deliberation also made participants rate the expert
presenting the weak message as less credible, which in turn also made them more confident in
the scientifically accurate verdict. Thus, as predicted—and consistent with dual-process mod-
els (i.e., ELM, HSM)—when individuals were focused on central information about the weak
expert, group discussion sensitized them to differences in the experts’ message strength, which
in turn made them more confident in the scientifically accurate verdict—without making
them skeptical of both experts.
In summary, factors promoting reliance on central information (i.e., NFC, cross-exami-
nation based on central information) about the weak expert made individuals within groups
more confident in the verdict that was consistent with the stronger expert. Specifically,
highlighting flaws in the weak message made mock jurors more confident in the scientifi-
cally accurate verdict, overall. Hearing a cross-examination that focused mock jurors on
flaws in the expert’s central message also made deliberation more helpful by sensitizing
them to the quality discrepancy between the two experts. Deliberation was not helpful, how-
ever, when the cross-examination focused exclusively on peripheral information about the
experts. In this condition, low NFC participants (who were naturally inclined to process
peripherally) became even less accurate, while high NFC jurors were buffered against this
decline in accuracy during deliberation.
Group accuracy results
The 32 juries were coded as 0 for failing to reach consensus on the scientifically accurate ver-
dict (i.e., unanimously agreeing on the verdict consistent with the weak expert or failing to
reach consensus, n = 19, 60%) or as 1 for reaching consensus on the scientifically accurate ver-
dict (n = 13; 40%). Given that we collapsed across counterbalancing conditions, this allowed
for 16 groups and 96 participants in each of the two cross-examination-type conditions. It is
important to note that participants spent most of their time discussing the experts’ message.
That is, the majority of all comments about experts were focused on central information (80%,
see Table 2). When participants did make peripheral deliberation comments (14%), they were
most commonly referring to the experts’ credentials and how often they testified for the prose-
cution or defense, but also the expert’s payment for testifying and manner of speaking while
testifying (Table 2). On the rare occasion (3%) that participants made a comment explicitly
rejecting peripheral information, they were typically rejecting the expert’s payment as a basis
for determining credibility.
We created a proportion to represent the extent to which mock jurors and juries relied on
peripheral, rather than central, information during deliberation. Because rejection-of-periph-
eral deliberation comments were so rare (3%) and more conceptually similar to central com-
ments, we combined them with central deliberation comments. To compute the “proportion
of peripheral deliberation comments” for each jury, we divided the number of peripheral
deliberation comments by the number of all classifiable comments about the experts. That is,
mathematically: peripheral deliberation comments / (peripheral + central + reject-peripheral
deliberation comments) for each jury. We also calculated this proportion for each individual
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participant. For example, if Participant A made 10 peripheral comments, 55 central delibera-
tion arguments, and 5 reject-peripheral deliberation arguments, her proportion of peripheral
comments would be 14%. This would be interpreted to mean that this mock juror relied on
peripheral information 14% of the time (and, conversely, she relied on central or rejection-of-
peripheral information 86% of the time). If Participant B had a higher proportion of peripheral
comments (e.g., 20%), he spent more time discussing peripheral, rather than central, informa-
tion relative to Participant A.
Do mock juries’ peripheral deliberation comments make them more or less likely to
reach the scientifically accurate verdict?. Next, we tested competing hypotheses regarding
whether discussing more peripheral information about the conflicting expert messages would
make mock juries more or less likely to side with the strong, rather than weak, expert message.
Our logistic regression with jury-level proportion of peripheral (versus central) deliberation
comments predicting jury-level verdict accuracy revealed that the more a jury discussed
peripheral information about the expert, the more likely it was to reach the scientifically accu-
rate verdict (i.e., the verdict in line with the strong expert message), B = 6.19, Wald = 3.91, p =
Table 2. Breakdown of comments made about experts during deliberation (n = 1642).
Comment Type N %
Central Deliberation Comments 1312 80%
Peripheral Deliberation Comments 229 14%
Expert’s credentials 71 31%
How often the expert testified for prosecution vs. defense 66 29%
The expert’s payment for testifying 31 13.5%
The expert’s personality or manner/style of speaking 30 13%
Speculation about other ulterior motives for testifying 10 4%
Procedural factor (e.g., the fact that there were two opposing experts) 10 4%
Other 11 5%
Rejection-of-Peripheral Deliberation Comments 41 3%
The expert’s payment for testifying 27 66%
How often the expert testified for prosecution vs. defense 9 22%
Expert’s credentials 3 7%
Speculation about other ulterior motives for testifying 2 5%
Unclassifiable Comments 56 3%
Comment Type N %
Central Deliberation Comments 1312 80%
Peripheral Deliberation Comments 229 14%
Expert’s credentials 71 31%
How often the expert testified for prosecution vs. defense 66 29%
The expert’s payment for testifying 31 13.5%
The expert’s personality or manner/style of speaking 30 13%
Speculation about other ulterior motives for testifying 10 4%
Procedural factor (e.g., the fact that there were two opposing experts) 10 4%
Other 11 5%
Rejection-of-Peripheral Deliberation Comments 41 3%
The expert’s payment for testifying 27 66%
How often the expert testified for prosecution vs. defense 9 22%
Expert’s credentials 3 7%
Speculation about other ulterior motives for testifying 2 5%
Unclassifiable Comments 56 3%
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0183580.t002
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.048, 95% CIs = [-.22, 12.61], 90% CIs = [.86, 11.53]. It is again important to note that this is in
the context of a high baseline of central deliberation comments (80%). Thus, our results do not
suggest that peripheral information on its own improves decision quality. Rather, it is the use
of central information, augmented by the use of some peripheral information, that led mock
juries to reach consensus on the scientifically accurate verdict.
Do scientifically accurate (but not scientifically inaccurate) participants’ peripheral
deliberation comments increase group accuracy because they are more persuasive?. Our
next analyses tested our explanation for this effect: Peripheral deliberation comments would
make scientifically accurate participants more persuasive and thereby more likely to convince
their mock jury of the more accurate decision. This was not predicted for scientifically inaccu-
rate participants, because making them more persuasive would lead people toward the less
accurate verdict.
We conducted a multilevel logistic regression with pre- and post-deliberation judgments
nested within individual participants, and participants nested within juries. The following pre-
dictors were included: (a) individual- participant-level proportion of peripheral (rather than
central) deliberation comments and a dummy code reflecting whether the participant pre-
ferred the scientifically accurate (0) or scientifically inaccurate (1) verdict before deliberation
(Level 1), (b) cross-examination type (Level 2), and (c) all interactions predicting whether
their jury reached the more accurate verdict.
A significant three-way interaction, OR = 5.49, t(114) = 3.42, p = .001, 95% CIs = [.72, 2.68],
indicated that when cross-examination focused participants on central information, the effec-
tiveness of peripheral deliberation comments depended on whether they were “in the right
hands”; that is, whether they were used to augment the comments of participants who were
arguing for the scientifically accurate or scientifically inaccurate verdict. To probe the interac-
tion, we assessed the simple interactions between peripheral deliberation comments and
whether the participant was arguing for the scientifically accurate verdict separately for each
cross-examination-type condition. This simple interaction was significant when the cross-
examination highlighted flaws in the expert’s central message, OR = 5.22, t(114) = 3.41, p =
.001, 95% CIs = [.70, 2.61] (Fig 5). More specifically (and as predicted), simple slopes revealed
that scientifically inaccurate participants’ proportion of peripheral deliberation comments did
not increase their jury’s accuracy, OR = 1.15, t(114) = .42, p = .67, 95% CIs = [-.51, .79]. Yet,
scientifically accurate participants’ proportion of peripheral deliberation comments positively
predicted their jury’s accuracy, OR = 6.01, t(114) = 4.43, p< .001, 95% CIs = [.99, 2.59]. In
other words, the more that participants arguing for the scientifically accurate verdict used
peripheral information (in addition to their high baseline of central information), the more
likely was their mock jury to reach the more scientifically accurate verdict.
The three-way interactive effect of whether the participant favored the scientifically accu-
rate or non-accurate verdict, the proportion of peripheral deliberation comments, and cross-
examination type condition on the likelihood of the jury choosing the more accurate verdict.
In contrast, when participants were focused on only peripheral information about the weak
expert via cross-examination, the simple interaction between whether participants were scien-
tifically accurate and their proportion of peripheral deliberation comments was not significant,
OR = .95, t(114) = -.45, p = .65, 95% CIs = [-.27, .17]. The mock jury’s accuracy remained low
in this condition regardless of how much peripheral information participants discussed and
whether they were arguing for a scientifically accurate or non-accurate verdict—these simple
main effects were not significant, Bs .17, ps .12.
Mediation analyses: Why did scientifically accurate participants’ peripheral delibera-
tion comments increase accuracy?. Next we tested whether this effect was due to scientifi-
cally accurate (but not scientifically inaccurate) participants being more persuasive when they
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brought up peripheral information during deliberation. First, we repeated the linear multilevel
regression model, with participants’ proportion of peripheral deliberation comments and a
dummy code reflecting whether the participants preferred the scientifically accurate (0) or sci-
entifically inaccurate (1) verdict pre-deliberation (Level 1), (b) cross-examination type (Level
2), and (c) all interactions as predictors of participants’ persuasiveness to their co-jurors during
deliberation.
Because scientifically accurate participants’ peripheral deliberation comments made their
juries more accurate only when the cross-examination highlighted flaws in the weak expert’s
central message, we limited the mediation analysis to this condition. We conducted a Monte
Carlo simulation [43] including the path coefficients and associated standard errors from (a) a
multilevel linear regression (with individual participants nested within juries) with the inde-
pendent variable (peripheral deliberation comments) predicting the mediator (perceived per-
suasiveness; i.e., path a in Fig 6), and (b) a multilevel logistic regression with the mediator
(perceived persuasiveness) predicting the dependent variable (jury accuracy) with the inde-
pendent variable included (i.e., path b in Fig 6).
The indirect effect of the proportion of peripheral deliberation comments on the group’s
likelihood of reaching the scientifically accurate verdict through participants’ persuasiveness to
their co-jurors as a function of whether the participant was scientifically accurate or non-accu-
rate (in central + peripheral cross-examination condition only).
The indirect effect of participants’ peripheral deliberation comments on their group’s accu-
racy through perceptions of their persuasiveness was significant for both scientifically accurate
and scientifically inaccurate participants—but with very different patterns. As predicted, the
more that scientifically accurate participants made peripheral deliberation comments, the
more persuasive they were to their co-jurors, and in turn, the more likely their mock jury was
Fig 5. The likelihood of the jury choosing the more accurate verdict as a function of arguments made
during deliberation.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0183580.g005
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to reach the more scientifically accurate verdict. In contrast, both paths were negative for sci-
entifically inaccurate participants: The more they used peripheral deliberation comments, the
less persuasive they were; also, the more persuasive they were, the less likely their group was to
reach the more accurate verdict. This significant indirect effect for scientifically inaccurate par-
ticipants suggests that their use of peripheral deliberation comments also increased group-
level accuracy–yet for a different reason than for scientifically accurate participants: Peripheral
deliberation comments reduced scientifically inaccurate participants’ persuasiveness, which
otherwise would have led the jury toward the less accurate verdict.
Raw count of deliberation comments predicting group accuracy. For the previous anal-
yses, we had calculated proportions (rather than analyzing the raw number of comments)
because proportions are the best method for capturing the theoretical construct of interest
(i.e., the extent to which deliberation comments were peripheral versus central), while control-
ling for the raw number of deliberation comments. Even so, one might wonder (as an anony-
mous reviewer did), whether juries who deliberated longer (i.e., made more comments) were
more likely to agree on the more scientifically accurate verdict. To address this question, we
ran a post-hoc and exploratory logistic regression with the raw number of comments that each
jury made predicting whether the group reached the more scientifically accurate verdict. Not
only did increasing the number of comments not significantly increase the group’s likelihood
of reaching the correct verdict, we found an unexpected effect in the reverse direction: The
more comments that the group made, the less likely the group was to reach the correct verdict,
B = -.01, Wald = 4.85, p = .033, 95% CI = [-.04, -.004]. It is important to note, however, that
this effect is significant only when using an uncorrected p-value threshold for significance (p<
.05) as though we were conducting an analysis to test for an effect we had predicted, which we
were not. Thus, the juries’ accuracy was driven not by the raw number of comments that were
made, but instead specifically by the proportion of those comments that were peripheral com-
ments about the experts.
Discussion
Despite the pervasiveness of group-based persuasion in everyday life, studies directly testing
dual-process predictions for group-level persuasion where the group’s members have to
Fig 6. The indirect effect of peripheral comments on scientifically accurate verdicts through
individuals’ persuasiveness.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0183580.g006
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deliberate together to reach consensus are rare. We examined the mechanisms and outcomes
of persuasive communication at the individual and group-level simultaneously by employing a
carefully controlled experimental design and advanced methodological and statistical tools.
This enabled a novel test of dual-process models (ELM, HSM) in the context of group decision
making, where most prior work focused on individual-level decision making. Our work, using
mock trial methodology, makes contributions to the social psychological literature on decision
making but also to the field of psychology and law, where jury decision making is of great theo-
retical and applied interest.
Consistent with dual-process models, individuals evaluated argument strength more accu-
rately when intrinsically (determined by their level of need for cognition) and/or extrinsically
(determined by cross-examination focus) motivated to focus on central or substantive infor-
mation within the testimony of an expert witness. Specifically, when cross-examination
focused individuals on an expert’s central message (i.e., the scientific quality of the studies he
presented to support his conclusions), group discussion during deliberation sensitized them to
a substantive credibility discrepancy between experts. In turn, individuals were more confident
in the strong expert’s argument, and led them to favor a more scientifically accurate verdict. In
contrast, when cross-examination focused individuals on peripheral heuristics about experts
(e.g., credentials, payment for testifying), group deliberation made some individuals favor a
verdict that was not consistent with the scientific evidence presented. Specifically, low NFC
individuals (who naturally find peripheral information persuasive) were less accurate after
deliberation, but high NFC individuals (who are not predisposed to being persuaded by
peripheral information) were buffered against this decline in accuracy during deliberation.
At the level of group discussion, we discovered that participants were most persuasive to
other mock jurors during deliberation when they supplemented central information with
peripheral information. This group process has not before been described in the scientific liter-
ature. Detailed coding of deliberation comments revealed that the more groups discussed
peripheral information about the experts that was completely unrelated to message quality
(how much he was paid, etc.), the more likely they were to reach the accurate decision in line
with the strong expert who presented a high-quality study. But this occurred only when the
peripheral information was used to bolster arguments being made by the participants who
were already favoring the scientifically accurate verdict. Therein lies the value of peripheral
information: It makes the participants who are arguing for the more accurate decision more
persuasive to people who might have been either unable or unmotivated to rely on central
information about the expert.
Although it would not be particularly surprising that peripheral information is persuasive
in general, this study demonstrates that peripheral information can help groups make deci-
sions that reflect more accurate assessments of central argument strength—even when the
peripheral information is intentionally unrelated to argument strength. Our study is unique
given the complexity of the methodological precautions used to ensure that peripheral infor-
mation was unrelated to expert argument strength, which enabled us to demonstrate that
unrelated peripheral information can help groups, specifically, reach better assessments of
message strength. This finding suggests that the process through which individuals reach accu-
rate assessments of argument strength in the aggregate gets more complicated at the group
level given the diversity of thinking styles and opinions in a group whose members must reach
consensus. The value of peripheral information about experts in our study is that it made par-
ticipants who are prone to recognize flaws in a central comments more persuasive to others
who either cannot grasp the implication of central information or simply do not find it com-
pelling, which ultimately led to their group being more likely to agree on the more accurate
decision in line with the strong expert.
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One interesting question raised by our data is whether this is a conscious strategy to con-
vince others. Do scientifically accurate participants, who were convinced to side with the
strong expert because of central information, attempt to use only central information, but
when they realize they are getting nowhere with that strategy, do they switch to peripheral
information (that they might not have themselves found compelling) just to convince others?
Do they intuitively “know their audience”—do they sense that some people are more likely to
be convinced by less central details, by heuristic processing? This is a fascinating question that
we believe would be very fruitful for future research, but given that our study was not designed
to test it, we remain agnostic at this point. Our data speak only to the argument that the more
scientifically accurate participants happen to make peripheral comments about the experts—
strategically or by chance—the more likely they are to get their group to agree on the verdict in
line with the strong expert. We hope this finding will inspire future researchers to investigate
more deeply the mechanism for this effect; for example, whether it is due to people matching
peripheral information to people who find it compelling when central information fails [28],
due to peripheral information bolstering the source credibility of a message participants
already found persuasive [44]—potentially in a post hoc rationalization process, or due to
other ways in which peripheral information made scientifically accurate participants more per-
suasive to the group.
The value of combining central and peripheral information during group
discussion
What advice would we give group members trying to bring their group to the accurate deci-
sion? Should they use central or peripheral information? Groups are diverse and will surely be
composed of those who find central information compelling, but also those who find periph-
eral information compelling. Our results suggest that both types of information are necessary
for several reasons. First, the baseline use of central information during deliberation was very
high: On average, groups discussed central information about the experts’ testimony 80% of
the time. Thus, our results should not be erroneously interpreted as an argument in favor of
using peripheral information instead of central information; rather, we suggest that using at
least some peripheral information above and beyond a large base of central information will
appeal to groups of diverse opinions and might be more likely to bring a group to the more
accurate decision than would focusing exclusively on central information.
Second, we found that peripheral information helped scientifically accurate participants
convince their co-jurors of the more accurate decision only when deliberation followed expo-
sure to a version of cross-examination that included central information about the expert’s
message quality. Thus, for scientifically accurate participants to sway others with peripheral
information, they (a) must themselves be certain that their opinion is correct, perhaps via
cross-examination that clearly highlighted the flaws in the weak expert’s study, and (b) need
an arsenal of central information in conjunction with the persuasive peripheral information.
Without the central cross-examination focusing on central information against the weak
expert, there might not have been a critical mass of participants who had confidently reached
the scientifically accurate verdict before deliberation in the first place, and those who had
might not have had enough of a foundation of central information upon which the peripheral
information could be successfully added to build a more persuasive message.
Theoretical implications
The current work has important theoretical implications. It has been argued that group pro-
cesses can differ quantitatively from individual processes by reproducing, amplifying, or
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attenuating individual processes [45–46], suggesting that processes are similar for individuals
and groups but differ in degree. Although differences between individual and group outcomes
can often be explained by similar processes, there are some exceptions [47]. For example,
Wright, Luus, and Christie [48] found that groups were sensitive to consensus information but
individuals were not, which suggests a different process. Our data tentatively suggest another
way that group processes might differ qualitatively from individual processes. Although
peripheral information can be detrimental to individuals’ assessment of argument strength,
peripheral information about a message source (even if irrelevant to the source’s argument
strength by design) can play a helpful role in during group discussion. Peripheral heuristics
about a source can be beneficial to groups assessing argument strength not because they are
actually diagnostic of argument strength, but because they help jurors arguing for the more
accurate assessment of argument strength be more persuasive, which is required for the group
to reach consensus. Thus, dual-process theories need to account for the cognitive diversity of
people who need be convinced to achieve consensus—including those who are either unable
or unwilling to rely on strong central information.
The fact that peripheral information helped groups evaluate argument strength when used
in combination with central information is consistent with the Heuristic-Systematic Model’s
contention that heuristic and systematic processing can occur simultaneously to affect judg-
ments when they are congruent [3, 30–31]. This finding is inconsistent, however, with the
ELM and other findings demonstrating that heuristic/peripheral information has no effect
when systematic/central processing occurs (e.g., [2, 13, 49–50]. It might be the case that this
facet of the ELM does not apply to groups comprising a set of individuals with diverse cogni-
tive styles. That is, group processing that requires individuals who rely on both central and
peripheral information to agree might need concurrent peripheral and central information to
do so successfully.
Practical implications
Our study also has important implications for the legal system. Of course, in an actual trial,
there is no definitive ground truth to classify what is an “accurate” verdict—what a jury decides
is considered accurate by the legal system, unless the decision is appealed and vacated. By con-
ducting a tightly controlled experiment, however, we were able to define a “scientifically accu-
rate” verdict: a verdict in line with expert testimony based on a high-quality scientific study.
This has relevance for actual trials. That is, the legal system is built on the assumption that ver-
dicts follow the best evidence presented in a case, both case facts and scientific evidence that
informs the interpretation of case facts. We demonstrated that mock jurors’ sensitivity to sci-
entific evidence quality can be improved through cross-examination that highlights flaws in
low-quality scientific evidence, which is consistent with some prior experiments [51–53], but
contradicts others (e.g., [54–55]). We discovered that cross-examination that highlighted flaws
in the weak expert’s message was helpful, in part, because it made deliberation more produc-
tive. This suggests a potential explanation for why previous studies omitting deliberation
found cross-examination ineffective in this regard [54–55]. Importantly, the cross-examina-
tion that included central information about the experts sensitized the mock jurors to the qual-
ity discrepancy between the two experts, which led them to more scientifically accurate
verdicts without making them skeptical of both experts, which has been a concern in cases
with dueling experts (e.g.,[56]). Attorneys are often advised to avoid addressing flaws in the
expert’s science unless they are as knowledgeable about how the expert’s work hurts their case
as the expert is (e.g., [36]). Further, attorneys have difficulty distinguishing between low and
high quality science and effectively bringing this out in cross-examination [57]. Given these
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findings, along with previous studies (that did not include deliberation) that argue cross-exam-
ination is not an effective way to sensitize jurors to expert quality, it is important to inform
attorneys that their cross-examination efforts can actually be effective.
Further, the coding of all comments about expert witnesses demonstrated that mock jurors
spent almost half of the time discussing the expert testimony (41%). Among those comments
about experts, mock juries spent the majority of their time focusing on central (rather than
peripheral) information about expert testimony (80%) (see [32], for information about what
actual jurors think about experts). These data support Diamond and others’ challenges to crit-
ics of the jury who argue that jurors are incompetent and irresponsible, lazily relying on heu-
ristics rather than attempting to evaluating experts’ testimony centrally (e.g., [14, 58]. This
conclusion might be weakened if our college sample was overall more motivated than a typical
community venire to process information, reflected in higher overall NFC scores. Yet this
intuition is not well supported, with some studies finding that students’ NFC scores to be
higher than community members’ (e.g., [59]), but others finding the opposite [60–61].
Finally, we provided empirical support for the argument that mock jury versus juror deci-
sion-making processes might differ qualitatively [45, 62]. Thus, we have provided an impor-
tant justification for including deliberation in mock jury studies testing behavior that may be
modified through group discussion, given that many argue that deliberation does not have an
important impact on verdicts and therefore is not worth the massive time and cost involved.
Although some vilify jurors’ reliance on peripheral heuristics to judge experts’ credibility,
jury instructions give jurors free rein to rely on credentials in judging the credibility of experts
[14]. In fact, our study revealed that peripheral heuristics can even be helpful to groups who
are assessing message strength, because heuristics help jurors who accurately assessed the mes-
sage quality be more persuasive to a more diverse group—while also demonstrating no danger
of helping inaccurate jurors convince juries of the less accurate verdict.
Finally, although applications of our study to legal decision making are most obvious, the
work is also applicable to groups reaching consensus on many other issues such as public pol-
icy, foreign relations, hiring, etc.
Strengths, caveats, and future directions
We took great care to set up a complex judgment problem that included both individual and
group decision making that could be scored for “accuracy,” and in which we could investigate
both measured and manipulated likelihood of relying on central and peripheral information.
To ensure internal validity, we specifically controlled not only our cross-examination manipu-
lation, but also the NFC composition of the groups and complexity of the two experts’ testi-
mony, and we counterbalanced several factors to rule out alternative explanations (e.g.,
whether the plaintiff or defense presented the strong research, which actor played which
expert). This enabled us to contribute to the basic social psychological literature regarding
dual-process models (e.g., ELM, HSM) in individuals versus groups. Although mock jury stud-
ies are never completely representative of the real jury deliberation process, we also took great
care to design our study in a manner that would make generalizations to the legal arena
possible.
It is very difficult to study actual jurors and juries (but see [32]; The Arizona Jury Project,
e.g., [63]), especially when investigating issues that require strict experimental control as did
our particular research question. To ensure external validity, we used realistic testimony and
legal charges, actual state pattern jury instructions that would be used in such a case, and had
lawyers review our materials for realism. We also made sure our participants were jury eligible,
and even though they were students, recent work finds negligible differences between student
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and non-student samples in most mock jury studies [64–66]. Nonetheless, replicating the
work with older community members would be useful. We also went beyond many other jury
simulations by including audio (rather than written) testimony and jury deliberation (rather
than relying on individuals’ judgments), which is rare given the effort they require. This
advanced methodology enabled us to contribute to the psychology and law literature regarding
mock jurors’ ability to evaluate science in the courtroom, as well as potential interventions to
improve this ability.
Replication is always important, and there are many interesting variations of the current
study that were beyond the scope of this already complex methodology, but which would
make excellent future studies. For example, it could be argued that one should assess whether
participants’ comments were (a) favorable or unfavorable to the expert, (b) about the strong or
weak expert, or (c) expressing agreement or disagreement with other mock jurors—and surely
many others. We did not do so because these added layers would make an already very com-
plex analysis even more complicated, and would result in coding categories containing too few
comments on which to conduct meaningful analyses—but also because it was not necessary to
test the theory we set out to test. The extent to which jurors focus on central versus peripheral
information about experts should predict their accuracy regardless of the expert on which they
are focusing. For example, if jurors are focusing on central information about the experts, that
process should lead them to better assess testimony quality—and that theory should hold
regardless of whether they are talking about how strong the strong expert’s study was, about
how weak the weak expert’s study was, or incorrectly stating that the strong expert’s study is
weak and then being corrected, etc.
It might also be argued that it would be informative to manipulate the NFC composition of
the juries to include all high NFC participants versus all low NFC participants. We did not do
so for external validity purposes and because this comparison was not necessary to test our the-
ory. Further, we arranged mock juries as we did to test our theory that jurors who were arguing
for a more scientifically accurate verdict would be more persuasive to cognitively diverse
groups (i.e., half high NFC, half low NFC) when they augmented their central information
with peripheral information.
Ours was a first step in demonstrating that scientifically accurate participants are more per-
suasive to their jury when using peripheral information, which makes the group more accu-
rate. Important next steps could be to investigate why peripheral information was more
persuasive when made by jurors arguing for the more scientifically accurate verdict, or to com-
pare a cross-examination condition that included only central information against the weak
expert to the two cross-examination conditions in the present study. Our study was a single
study representing large-scale, in-depth, exploratory research that is rigorous and can serve as
a catalyst for future researchers to pursue novel hypotheses (e.g., [67]) inspired by a rare inves-
tigation of dual process models (i.e., ELM, HSM) at the group level.
Conclusion
The current study expanded previous investigations of seminal dual-process models of persua-
sion by integrating individual- and group-level processes within one study and analyzing the
central versus peripheral content of mock deliberation comments. In doing so, we identified a
novel psychological phenomenon that might not be predicted or captured by current dual-
process theories of individual decision-making. Peripheral heuristics about a persuasion
source, which typically detract from individuals' discrimination between strong and weak
arguments, had an ironically helpful effect on groups' assessment of argument strength when
used in conjunction with central information. Despite being intentionally unrelated to
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message quality, peripheral information served an important purpose during intragroup per-
suasion: It made group members who were arguing for the more scientifically accurate deci-
sion more persuasive to their fellow group members, which in turn, made the group more
likely to agree on the scientifically accurate decision. Thus, although peripheral information
reduces decision quality at the individual level, it can improve the quality of group decisions—
as long as it is in the right hands.
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